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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
United States v. Gattas, 862 F.2d 1432
Before sentencing, petitioner's trial counsel objected to statements
made in the Presentence Investigation Report (PSI). The district judge
orally disclaimed reliance on the statements and sentenced petitioner.
Petitioner's new counsel filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct
sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 claiming the district court failed to
comply with Rule 32(c)(3)(D) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, which requires a sentencing court to attach a written record of its
resolution of contested matters concerning the PSI to the report.
The Tenth Circuit held that the judge failed to include a written
statement of his nonreliance on disputed statements to the PSI as re-
quired. Because the PSI is important in the correction process of crimi-
nal defendants, the court held that the petitioner has a valid § 2255
claim. The court stated that resentencing is not an appropriate remedy
when the sentencing judge did not rely on disputed facts in the PSI.
Instead, the court remanded for attachment of the proper record to the
PSI.
United States v. Mar, 856 F.2d 1471
Defendant moved to vacate his conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court
summarily denied Marr's motion and he appeals asserting that the dis-
trict court erred in dismissing his motion without conducting an eviden-
tiary hearing on his claim.
The Tenth Circuit held that an evidentiary hearing is not required
when the district court finds that the record conclusively shows the de-
fendant is entitled to no relief. However, the district court's order deny-
ing relief upon a motion for ineffective assistance of counsel must
indicate that the court reviewed the records before concluding that de-
fendant's counsel was competent. The district court judge should enu-
merate the issues raised by the prisoner and explain the reasons for
actions taken. Such reasoned decision provides a basis for appellate
review.
Since the order failed to indicate whether the records of the case
were reviewed, the court vacated the decision and remanded to allow
the district court enter appropriate findings.
Stines v. Martin, 849 F.2d 1323
Plaintiff was detained in prison indefinitely for civil contempt when
he filed for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The government responded
after the required time for filing, but before the scheduled hearing. The
court granted plaintiff's writ and ordered him released.
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The government argues on appeal that the court's order is
equivalent to a default judgment which should not be permissible in
habeas corpus proceedings. The Tenth Circuit declined to decide
whether a default judgment could 'ever be granted in such proceedings.
It found that when the actual delay is not sufficiently extensive or egre-
gious so as to violate due process considerations, a default judgment is
inappropriate. Reversed and remanded.
United States v. Fadel, 844 F.2d 1425
Fadel was indicted by a federal grand jury with conspiracy to pos-
sess and distribute cocaine and two counts of distributing cocaine.
Fadel filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds of outra-
geous governmental misconduct and entrapment, allegedly arising out
of the government's undercover investigation. In response, the govern-
ment stated that Fadel's motion was premature and inappropriate for
pretrial consideration. The district court rejected this position. The
government presented Hafen's testimony to rebut Fadel's allegations
and to create a factual issue for the jury. The government presented the
testimony of Hafen, an undercover officer with whom Fadel had dis-
cussed future drug dealings. The district court finally dismissed the in-
dictment with prejudice stating that the government had not disputed
Fadel's affidavit as to his lack of predisposition to engage in criminal
activity. The government contends this decision on appeal.
The Tenth Circuit held that the defense of entrapment is inter-
twined with the issue of intent and is based on credibility determina-
tions, an area traditionally reserved for the jury. The court held that
Fadel's admissions in his motion to dismiss read in conjunction with
Hafen's testimony clearly created a factual dispute that precluded pre-
trial findings of entrapment by the district court as a matter of law.
United States v. Keiswetter, 860 F.2d 992
Appellant Keiswetter was charged with a felony of knowingly con-
verting property. He agreed to plead guilty to a misdemeanor of con-
version in exchange for a dismissal of the felony charge. The district
court accepted the plea. However, Keiswetter later moved to withdraw
his guilty plea. The district court denied the motion and sentenced him.
Appellant appealed the sentence.
The Tenth Circuit remanded the case for clarification of the district
judge's reasons for finding that a factual basis existed for the charge to
which appellant pleaded guilty. A guilty plea will not be invalidated
when the evidence is clear that a defendant voluntarily and knowingly
pled guilty. The court held that there is adequate evidence that Keiswet-
ter understood that a guilty plea was in his best interest. However, it is
unclear whether the court found that the evidence on which the judge
relied to reach his conclusion was adequate to believe that Keiswetter
possessed the requisite intent for the crime of conversion.
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United States v. Jones, 852 F.2d 1275
After a jury verdict convicting appellant Jones of conspiracy to pos-
sess with intent to distribute a controlled substance, Jones unsuccess-
fully sought a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. He
claimed that his attorney had failed to call witnesses who could have
substantiated Jones' actual physical and mental need for powerful drugs
because of his chronic back problems.
The Tenth Circuit held that Jones received assistance of effective
counsel, and although there were some deficiencies, they did not result
in prejudicial error. The court held that an error, even if professionally
unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside ajudgment if the error had
no effect.
United States v. Medlin, 842 F.2d 1194
Appeal from trial court's order to suppress all evidence seized in a
search of appellee's home including evidence specifically described in a
valid search warrant. The court found that additional goods seized were
beyond the scope of the search warrant and unsupported by the govern-
ment's claim that the appellee's consent obviated the need for an addi-
tional search warrant.
The court held that where a search pursuant to a valid warrant is
executed in a manner exhibiting "flagrant disregard" for the terms of
the warrant (here, 667 items outside the scope of the warrant were
seized) the suppression of all evidence seized under the warrant is
required.
United States v. Guiterrez, 839 F.2d 648
In 1965, Guiterrez pleaded guilty to a federal offense. In 1980, he
was convicted again under New Mexico law and was given a life sentence
due to the prior federal offense. He then filed a motion to vacate or set
aside his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that his 1965
guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. The United States moved to
dismiss the motion stating that Guiterrez understood the plea. In the
alternative, the government contended that the motion should be dis-
missed pursuant to Rule 9(a) of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceeding
because the government had been prejudiced in its ability to respond to
the motion by the twenty-year delay in bringing it.
A magistrate recommended dismissal of the motion under Rule
9(a), and the district court adopted the recommendation. The Tenth
Circuit held that a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 may be filed at any
time. However, Rule 9(a) does require that before considering matters
outside of the pleadings in dismissing a section 2255 motion, the district
court must provide notice to the movant. The district court erred in
dismissing Guiterrez's motion without giving him notice that it intended
to treat the government's motion as a motion for summary judgment
and for failing to provide Guiterrez with an evidentiary hearing before
1989]
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summarily denying his motion on the merits. Vacated and remanded in
part.
United States v. Gipson, 835 F.2d 1323
Following indictment, appellant Gipson sought removal of the trial
judge because the judge had been the United States attorney when Gip-
son had been convicted of an offense similar to that for which he stood
charged. Thejudge claimed impartiality. The trial court denied the mo-
tion to recuse. Gipson entered an unconditional guilty plea, was sen-
tenced, and now appeals the denial of his motion to recuse.
The Tenth Circuit held that entry of an unconditional plea of guilty
generally constitutes a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects in the pro-
ceeding. When Gipson entered his plea, he waived his right to appeal
the denial of recusal based on the judge's appearance of impartiality.
The court affirmed Gipson's conviction.
United State v. Mora, 845 F.2d 233
Appellants were tried jointly and convicted of distributing cocaine
and conspiracy of distributing cocaine. At trial, the prosecutor made
statements in his closing argument about appellants' post arrest silence
in contrast to another defendant's statement the night of the arrest after
being given her Miranda rights. Appellants appeal their conviction stat-
ing that the prosecutor improperly commented on their post-arrest si-
lence and thus violated their Miranda rights.
The Tenth Circuit held that when reviewing a comment about a de-
fendant's right to remain silent, the court must look at the context in
which the statement was made to determine its manifest intent and its
impact on the jury. Manifest intent will not be found if some other ex-
planation for the prosecutor's remark is plausible. The court held that
the statements were neither manifestly intended to be a comment on
appellants' silence nor would the jury necessarily take them to be.
United States v. Friesen, 853 F.2d 816
Friesen, an attorney, was found not guilty of intentionally manufac-
turing cocaine. He moved to expunge all records related to his arrest.
Without taking evidence, the district court found that the arrest on drug
related charges resulted in a stigma that acquittal alone would not re-
solve. The United States appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that the trial court could not exercise its
discretion to order expunction without a showing of extreme circum-
stances. Noting lack of any findings of fact, the court remanded the case
for an evidentiary hearing.
United States v. Dunn, 841 F.2d 1026
Pursuant to an investigation, fifteen people were indicted on vari-
ous cocaine possession and distribution charges. Six co-conspirators
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entered guilty pleas and testified for the government. Dunn was con-
victed and sentenced. He appealed following denials of his motions for
judgment of acquittal and a new trial. Dunn contended that the district
court's denial of his pre-trial motion for a bill of particulars caused prej-
udicial surprise and impeded his ability to present a defense.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its dis-
cretion when it denied Dunn's motion for a bill of particulars. A defend-
ant must show that he was actually surprised and incurred prejudice.
Dunn's counsel failed to make known to the district court what he con-
sidered prejudicial surprise until after the verdict. He should have
brought the matter to the district court's attention when it occurred.
Additionally, Dunn contends that each time a co-conspirator testi-
fied thejury should have been instructed that the testimony could not be
used as substantive evidence of another's guilt. The court held that
although that instruction is preferable per se, plain error cannot be found
on this error alone.
United States v. Wolf, 839 F.2d 1387
Second degree murder and aiding and abetting second degree mur-
der convictions, resulting from incidents of child abuse, were affirmed.
There was no Brady violation because the prosecution gave autopsy re-
ports to the defense. There was, therefore, no suppression of material
evidence favorable to the defendants. The court also upheld the admis-
sion of hearsay evidence under the co-conspirators exception. Declar-
ant was not a member of the conspiracy, but was testifying as to
statements the co-conspirator had made. The district court had made
sufficient findings of a conspiracy to allow the exception and it was
harmless error that one of the statements made was "more narrative"
and not in furtherance of the conspiracy.
United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d 1110
The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's conviction for voluntary
manslaughter. An FBI agent handed a business card to the suspect and
his subsequent voluntary interview was not held an improper continua-
tion of interrogation. The ultimate confession was not suppressible
where the suspect voluntarily waived his right to an attorney.
An accused's invocation of his right to counsel is not a bar to fur-
ther interrogation as long as the accused himself initiates further con-
versation and the government carries the burden of proof that he
subsequently waived his right to counsel.
White v. Meachum, 838 F.2d 1137
An Oklahoma state prisoner initiated a civil rights action challeng-
ing on ex poste facto grounds the state's method of computing good
time credits. The district court construed the complaint as a petition for
writ of habeas corpus and dismissed it for failure to exhaust administra-
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tive remedies. The court of appeals affirmed the holding that White
must give the appellate court the opportunity to grant relief.
Worthen v. Meachum, 842 F.2d 1179
Worthen claims his guilty plea was involuntary. The district court
held he could not challenge his guilty plea because he had not shown
cause and prejudice after his failure to raise the issue properly in state
court. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, stating a defendant may not appeal
from a conviction on a guilty plea if he does not apply to withdraw the
plea within ten days ofjudgment or sentence. The district court applied
the wrong test for holding that Worthen could not obtain federal habeas
review. The appropriate test is the deliberate bypass test of Fay.
A remand was not necessary because the court held that even if he
had established sufficient cause for failure to appeal, Worthen had not
demonstrated actual prejudice.
Hannon v. Maschner, 845 F.2d 1553
Defendant Hannon appeals the denial of his petition to the district
court for a writ of habeas corpus some 25 years after being sentenced
for murder. The court of appeals held that state allegations that the trial
judge and court reporter had died, and that the prosecutor couldn't re-
member the case were not enough to show prejudice (undue delay) suf-
ficient to bar retrial on the grounds that defendant was denied due
process, since his attorney had never perfected his appeal. On remand,
the court should make a determination whether equitable considerations
mandate substantive review, even if burden of showing prejudice is sus-
tained by the prosecution.
United States v. Barrera, 843 F.2d 1576
Appellant Barrera appeals his conviction of manufacturing
methamphetamine and possession of the same with intent to distribute.
Affirmed.
The grounds of Barrera's appeal was the refusal of the district court
to allow an examination of the government's informant, and the exist-
ence of misstatements in the affidavit used to secure the search warrant.
The court of appeals held that the testimony of the informant in an in
camera examination gave the district court a sufficient basis on which to
deny the motion to examine the informant, and that a search warrant
affidavit is not rendered fatally flawed by misstatements when there is
ample showing of probable cause in the affidavit despite them.
United States v. Cook, 854 F.2d 371
Appellant United States makes an interlocutory appeal of the dis-
trict court's decision to suppress a quantity of cocaine which was evi-
dence of narcotics laws violations. Reversed.
In deciding to suppress the evidence, the district court held that the
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affidavit on which the search warrant was based did not establish suffi-
cient probable cause. The affidavit had been reviewed by an assistant
district attorney and a state judge, both of whom approved it. Given
these facts, the court of appeals held that a well trained officer would not
have known the search was illegal, and that because of this, the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply.
United States v. Cronic, 839 F.2d 1401
Appellant Cronic appeals his conviction of mail fraud violations on
the grounds of inadequate representtion. Reversed and remanded.
In its case, the government alleged mail fraud violations for a
"check kiting" scheme. The government based its case on the incorrect
belief that writing a check on an account with insufficient funds is auto-
matically fraud. It has long been held, however, that good faith is a
complete defense under the mail fraud statutes. Cronic's counsel never
discovered this, and instead based his defense on a questionable strat-
egy of "clouding the issues." The court of appeals found this level of
incompetence clearly prejudiced the defendant, and that a new trial was
warranted.
United States v. Daniels, 857 F.2d 1392
Appellant Daniels makes an interlocutory appeal of the district
court's denial of his motion to dismiss conspiracy charges on double
jeopardy grounds. Affirmed.
Daniels was indicted and charged with conspiracy to manufacture
amphetamine. In making his motion to dismiss, he claimed he had ear-
lier pled guilty to another charge of conspiracy to manufacture ampheta-
mine, and the current indictment charged the same offense. The
testimony on this issue was conflicting, which presented an issue of fact
to the judge. The court of appeals noted that when factual issues such
as this are presented, the district judge has a right to resolve issues in a
fashion adverse to a defendant.
United States v. Vap, 852 F.2d 1249
Defendant appeals conviction in district court of making false decla-
rations under oath before a grand jury. The Tenth Circuit held that the
delay of one year between the perjury before the grand jury and the
indictment charging perjury did not constitute denial of due process,
despite defendant's contention that the perjury related to state illegal
kickback charges which the government allegedly knew of several years
before the perjury indictment. Perjury to which preindictment delay re-
lated had not been committed until the grand jury testimony was given.
The court held that defendant's statements before the grand jury were
material. For testimony to give rise to perjury under statute, it need not
have the actual effect of influencing, misleading or hampering the grand
jury; rather, testimony merely must be capable of influencing the grand
1989]
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jury. Finally, the court held that the trial court error in conducting the
materiality hearing in front of the jury was harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt. Convincing evidence was presented that defendant, despite
his denials in front of the grand jury, was offered and received cash pay-
ments. The evidence adduced at the materiality hearing was only a
small part of the trial. Affirmed.
Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612
Appellants Shillinger and McClintock (the state of Wyoming) ap-
peal a district court's ruling which granted Kevin Osborn's petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. Affirmed.
In 1982, Osborn pled guilty to a series of crimes which included
felony murder. He was later sentenced to death. Osborn petitioned for
post conviction relief at the state district court level, primarily on the
basis of ineffectiveness of counsel. This petition, and a later petition for
reconsideration, were denied for procedural reasons, and neither was
directly appealed. When Osborn later petitioned the federal district
court for habeas corpus, the state of Wyoming argued Osborn had not
exhausted the state remedies, and that his claims were resolved on in-
dependent state procedural grounds. Affirming the district court deci-
sion, the Tenth Circuit noted that Osborn's state remedies had been
exhausted prior to the district court's decision, the state procedural
rules did not bar later federal review where a petitioner is not reason-
ably aware that a violation of the rules will prevent a court from address-
ing the merits of his claim, and that the district court's finding of
ineffectiveness of counsel was amply supported by the record.
Reyes v. Quintana, 853 F.2d 784
Reyes, convicted of second-degree murder, was sentenced to nine
years for the homicide, plus three under a New Mexico enhancement
provision for aggravating circumstances. Reyes claimed the enhance-
ment provision exposed him to double jeopardy since the trial court im-
properly injected the issue of premeditation into the sentencing even
though the jury had already found to the contrary when it convicted him
of only second-degree murder.
Upholding the enhancement provision, the Tenth Circuit ruled that
the record contained no indication that the trial court relied on a delib-
erate intent to kill when applying the enhancement provision. It merely
found that Reyes had pursued his victim. Pursuit is not tantamount to a
deliberate intent to kill. Such consideration by the trial court did not
violate Reyes' rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Reyes simply
confused the process of proving elements with that of weighing circum-
stances. Dismissal of the habeas corpus petition affirmed.
United States v. Billings, 858 F.2d 617
Defendant Billings appeals the district court's denial of his motion
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to suppress observations by two Denver police officers. The district
court denied the motion because the defendant had no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy. Affirmed.
In June 1987, two Denver police officers assigned to the narcotics
unit, observed Billings disembark from an arriving Miami flight at Den-
ver Stapleton Airport and followed him through the terminal and into a
public restroom, whereupon they observed (through the open area be-
tween the stall and the floor) him remove a clear bag full of white sub-
stance taped to his left ankle. Thereafter, the police officers followed
him back into the terminal, identified themselves and asked him for
identification. Billings verbally identified himself and permitted the of-
ficers to search his baggage where they found two plastic bags of white
powder. The defendant then fled the scene but was subdued, and later
placed under arrest. A search incident to the arrest revealed two more
bags of cocaine taped to his ankles. Billings contended at trial that the
request for identification and subsequent search were invalid because
they stemmed from the officer's initial sighting of cocaine while the de-
fendant was inside a bathroom stall which violated defendant's reason-
able expectation of privacy. The district court concluded that there can
be no reasonable expectation of privacy within that area of the bathroom
stall observable by the ordinary patron of a public lavoratory.
United States v. Theron, 849 F.2d 477
Defendant was indicted and pleaded guilty to charges of mail fraud
and conspiracy. Although the district court advised him it was not
bound by any recommendations, it failed to advise, in violation of the
mandatory requirements of Rule 1 l(e)(2), Fed. R. Crim. P., that in this
event defendant would not be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea.
Prior to sentencing, defendant unsuccessfully attempted to withdraw his
plea. Defendant appeals.
The government argues that defendant failed to raise a Rule 11
claim before the court and that the court's action was harmless error.
The Tenth Circuit determined defendant had raised the substance of
this claim and that in these circumstances, where defendant was not fa-
miliar with procedure, counsel withdrew immediately prior to the hear-
ing, and new counsel was left with inadequate preparation time,
defendant's failure was understandable. The Tenth Circuit found that
even if defendant and his counsel failed to detect the court's error he
could nonetheless be affected by it. The record supports defendant's
confusion as to his plea, and indicates defendant believed he could with-
draw his plea if recommendations were not followed. The Tenth Circuit
held that there was a reasonable possibility defendant was confused and
that Rule 11 compliance could have avoided the violation and was there-
fore not harmless error. Conviction and sentencing vacated; reversed
and remanded.
1989]
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United States v. Wicker, 848 F.2d 1059
The government claims abuse of discretion in excluding testimony
or the report of its expert due to its failure to comply with a motion to
compel discovery. Rule 16(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure gives the court broad discretion in imposing sanctions on one who
fails to comply with a discovery order, including prohibiting the party
from introducing evidence not disclosed. The Tenth Circuit found the
three criteria of United States v. Euceda-Hernandez, 768 F.2d 1307 (11 th
Cir. 1985), applies as a guideline when considering sanctions under this
rule. Although the district court did not discuss bad faith, the Tenth
Circuit found no abuse of discretion in its finding that negligence on the
part of the government's expert in not providing the report until imme-
diately prior to trial where only one request for the report was made did
not justify delay. The district court also found there would be prejudice
to defendants here because the deal in providing the report left defend-
ants' counsel with inadequate time to prepare for trial. Lastly, the Tenth
Circuit found the district court was justified in its sanctions where the
demands of the court's calendar disfavor a second continuance.
Affirmed.
United States v. Maynes-Ortega, 857 F.2d 686
This court affirmed a previous decision that evidence of drugs
found in plain view in the trunk of a car can be used as evidence even
though they were discovered accidentally by officers conducting a search
for evidence of a different type of offense; in this case, transportation of
illegal aliens. To require prosecutors to use only evidence related to a
particular offense of which they had specifically suspected the defendant
and had consequently obtained in the course of searches and seizures
aimed at that particular crime would be a grotesque parody of efficient
law enforcement.
Also at issue was whether newly discovered evidence was sufficient
for a new trial. The newly discovered evidence must be more than im-
peaching or cumulative; it must be material to the issues involved and
must be such that it would probably produce an acquittal. A new trial is
not warranted if the new evidence is such that it could have been discov-
ered and produced with reasonable diligence at the original trial. Since
defendant's evidence was merely impeachment on an immaterial issue
and could not possibly have resulted in a different verdict, a new trial
was denied.
Johnson v. Riveland, 855 F.2d 1477
Plaintiff filed an application for post conviction relief requesting
credit for the time he had spent in pretrial confinement. The Colorado
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the district court lacked juris-
diction to modify the sentence after it had been commuted by the Gov-
ernor. The Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari.
726 [Vol. 66:4
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While Johnson's habeas petition was pending in the United States
District Court, he was released on parole. On its own motion the court
of appeals addressed the issue of mootness. Finding no live controversy
because of the parole, the court vacated the district court's judgment
and remanded with directions to dismiss for mootness.
United States v. Stemm, 847 F.2d 636
Defendant claimed the United States Attorney's office breached a
plea agreement through its participation in the preparation of the prose-
cutions's version and the culpability ranking in the presentence investi-
gation report. The Tenth Circuit looked at information the U.S.
Attorney's office provided ranking defendants with respect to culpability
in the scheme.
Disclosure of information as to the nature of the offense, and each
defendant's role, is proper and within the Government's duty to provide
despite a premise that the Government would make no recommendation
as to sentence. Since the record showed no breach of the plea agree-
ment, this court affirmed the lower court.
Defendant further alleged the presentence report was unreliable,
that its preparation violated 32(c)(1) Fed. R. Crim. P., and that there was
such bias in the presentencing procedure that his due process rights
were violated. The probation officer may include statements by the gov-
ernment as well as those by the defendant; otherwise, critical informa-
tion concerning such a large-scale scheme, cannot be made available
with the result of depriving sentencing judges of information which
would undermine modern phenological procedural policies. The judg-
ment and sentence were affirmed. Judge Seymour dissented because he
believes when viewed in totality, the government's inclusion of the cul-
pability rankings in the pre-sentence report constituted a breach of the
plea agreement.
Moore v. Dubois, 848 F.2d 1115
Appellant Moore was sent to prison for armed robbery and then
paroled. Parole was revoked after he stabbed a former girl friend with a
knife. Paroled for a second time, his parole officer recommended parole
revocation after being told by appellant's sister that he had been forcing
her to have sex with him for a month, finally culminating in an assault
and rape when she refused. At the revocation hearings, however, she
testified that she lied to keep her mother from thinking she engaged in
sex willingly. The hearing officer, crediting her testimony, recom-
mended no parole violation for sexual harassment or assault. On review
the parole commission, concluding that her revised testimony was the
result of fear of appellant, revoked parole and Moore appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that in administrative proceedings, such as
parole hearings, decision makers do not violate due process when they
reject the findings of hearing examiners without personally hearing and
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observing key witnesses. When only conditional liberty interests (such
as parole) are at stake, the full procedural rights of criminal trial are not
needed (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)).
United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592
The government appeals from the district court's decision granting
defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized under a search warrant.
Affirmed.
Based on an affidavit alleging defendant Kleinberg was attempting
to illegally export equipment to the People's Republic of China, a war-
rant was issued to search the Kleinberg offices and seize certain specified
property. After two officers at Kleinberg were subsequently indicted for
conspiring to violate the Export Administration Act, the district court
granted a motion to suppress all evidence seized by the search, finding
that the affidavit was not supported by probable cause and that the war-
rant did not sufficiently specify the evidence to be seized.
The government contended that because the defendants had no
standing to raise a fourth amendment claim, the claimant must show a
subjective expectation of privacy in the area searched, and the expecta-
tion must be one that society will recognize as reasonable. The court of
appeals found that individual defendants have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in corporate offices. Absent a statutory scheme authorizing
warrantless searches, there is no waiver of constitutional rights by the
mere fact that the defendants chose to participate in an activity regu-
lated and licensed by the government. Therefore, the defendants had
standing to raise a fourth amendment claim.
The appellate court found the warrant to be facially overbroad be-
cause it authorized a general search in conjunction with a federal crime.
Reference in their warrant to two export statutes does not sufficiently
limit the scope of the warrant. This warrant did not meet even the mini-
mum requirement of allowing executing officers to distinguish between
items that may and may not be seized. In addition, while an affidavit
may cure an overbroad warrant, it can only do so where the affidavit and
the search warrant constitute one document. The Kleinberg warrant did
not incorporate the affidavit and there is no reference to the affidavit on
the face of the warrant. The Kleinberg warrant was also flawed because
information was available to provide a more particular description of the
items to be seized. Finally, the scope of the warrant was invalid for fail-
ure to contain limitations on its scope, and its extension beyond the
scope of the supporting affidavit. The court further held the evidence
inadmissible under the "good faith" exception because suppression of
the evidence in this case was appropriate to deter government miscon-
duct. The court did not review the probable cause issue.
Sanchez v. Mondragon, 858 F.2d 1462
Petitioner Sanchez appeals from the district court order denying
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with prejudice his petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the
trial court's inquiry into his decision to waive his right to counsel and
represent himself was inadequate and a violation of his sixth amendment
right to counsel. The district court affirmed that the state judge met the
constitutional requirements necessary to comply with sixth amendment
dictates. Reversed and remanded.
In June 1984, Sanchez was indicted on several counts related to a
residential burglary, and was later convicted of battery and possession of
a burglary tool, but acquitted of aggravated burglary and larceny. Prior
to the commencement of trial, Sanchez expressed dissatisfaction with his
public defender's performance and sought either a new attorney or the
opportunity to represent himself. The trial court permitted Sanchez to
serve as his own counsel whereupon he pled not guilty and proceeded to
trial. Upon conviction, he appealed in state court and lost, then filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Sanchez alleged that the trial court
conducted an insufficient inquiry into his request to proceed pro se.
The state trial judge failed to ensure that Sanchez's waiver of counsel
was not exercised as a means of choosing between incompetent counsel
and appearing pro se. Under the Faretta standards enumerated in United
States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952 (10th Cir. 1987), two inquires as to waiver
of counsel must be conducted on appeal in a collateral proceeding.
First, it must be determined that the defendant voluntarily chose to ap-
pear pro se; second, the defendant must knowingly and intelligently
have waived his right to counsel. The district court held that the state
trial judge did inform Sanchez of his rights under the sixth amendment
and adequately advised him of the disadvantages inherent in self-repre-
sentation, and further that Sanchez waived his right to counsel volunta-
rily and intelligently. This court reversed on the grounds that the trial
judge's inquiry into Sanchez's reasons for waiving his right to counsel
was inadequate and there is reasonable doubt that had he been repre-
sented by competent counsel, he would not have been found guilty.
United States v. Hornung, 848 F.2d 1040
Defendant was indicted in Oklahoma and charged with two counts
of assisting in the preparation of a false income tax, one count of con-
spiracy and one count of perjury. Defendant was found guilty of con-
spiracy and acquitted on the remaining counts. Defendant appeals on
Che grounds that he should have been granted a new trial because of
juror misconduct and argues the district court impermissibly amended
the indictment in its charge to the jury.
The court's questioning of a juror who is the recipient of extrane-
ous information is limited to the circumstances, nature, and extent of
the improper contact because Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) precludes the court
from delving into the subjective effect of the contact on the juror's deci-
sion-making. An objective test should be applied to determine whether
the defendant was prejudiced by the extrinsic information.
The Tenth Circuit court agrees with the district court that informa-
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tion imparted to a juror pertained to matters before the jury and deem
the contact to be presumptively prejudicial. However, the presumption
is overcome by the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt on
the conspiracy court. In deleting the year 1981 in its instruction on the
conspiracy charge, the district court did not change the meaning of the
charge from that presented to the grand jury or alter the government's
theory of the case, and did not result in any prejudice to the defendant.
United States v. Estrada, 849 F.2d 1304
Defendant, Robert Estrada, was seeking to overturn his conviction,
pursuant to a guilty plea was involuntary and that he was denied effec-
tive assistance of counsel, was denied by the district court without an
evidentiary hearing, and he appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 a prisoner is enti-
tled to a prompt evidentiary hearing to determine the issues and make
fact findings unless this motion and the record clearly indicate the pris-
oner is entitled to no relief.
Since defendant's contentions are not unsupported by specifics or
"incredible in the face of the trial record" he has the right to attempt to
prove his claims at an evidentiary hearing.
Remanded to district court for an evidentiary hearing on whether
Estrada's plea was voluntary.
Hurd v. Mondragon, 851 F.2d 324
Plaintiff filed a pro se petition, later amended by the federal public
defender, which alleged two causes of action based on violation of his
fourth and fourteenth amendment rights. Upon review, the U.S. Magis-
trate found plaintiff had exhausted his state remedies and therefore was
not entitled to collateral relief. Additionally, the Magistrate found plain-
tiff's trial counsel's decision not to pursue a third cause of action based
on impermissible "show-up" was a tactical one not resulting in revers-
ible error. The Magistrate recommended dismissing the petition with
prejudice.
After the Magistrate filed his proposed findings and recommenda-
tion, the federal public defender filed a motion to withdraw without
prejudice, which the district court denied. The Magistrate's recommen-
dation was upheld. Plaintiff appeals this decision, charging the district
court erred in dismissing with prejudice since he had not exhausted all
state remedies. The Tenth Circuit held that simply because Plaintiff un-
covered a third possible ground for relief which had not been litigated
did not create error in dismissing with prejudice. Plaintiff also claims a
change in law which permits him to withdraw without prejudice. How-
ever, the Tenth Circuit found that where, as here, the change in law
occurs prior rather than after the Magistrate's recommendation is filed




Grand Jury Proceedings of John Doe v. United States, 842 F.2d 244
A minor refused to testify against its parent before a grand jury,
asserting parent-child and family privileges. The district court issued a
contempt citation against the minor and the minor appealed. The
Tenth Circuit affirmed, refusing to expand the scope of testimonial priv-
ilege to include the parent-child and family privileges. The court held
that these privileges are not fundamental enough to be constitutionally
protected on privacy grounds. Furthermore, the court held that the
government's compelling interest in investigating crimes and enforcing
federal laws outweigh the appellant's free exercise of the Mormon reli-
gion, which would prevent the minor from testifying against the parent.
United States v. Smith, 838 F.2d 436
Appellants, Smith and Bailey, received a loan from the Stockman's
Bank and Trust Company, of Gillette, Wyoming, to finance the con-
struction of a condominium complex. The loan was approved only for
preliminary work on the site. Invoices were submitted by the subcon-
tracting companies formed by the appellants, and the money received
was then used by the appellants for purposes other than the condomin-
ium complex. The federally insured bank lost $225,000 in the
transaction.
A jury convicted the appellants on charges of conspiracy and mak-
ing false statements. To sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1014,
the prosecution had to prove that the defendants misrepresented their
intentions by the submission of the invoices. The Tenth Circuit held
that the prosecution's evidence that the appellants did not use the dis-
bursements for the stated purposes, and the ongoing nature of the in-
voice submissions, supported the jury's finding of intent to deceive the
bank.
The court also found that the jury verdict form which required the
jury to find the defendants guilty or not guilty "of making false state-
ments and aiding and abetting" was allowed under United States v. Cook,
745 F.2d 1311 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1220 (1985). A
defendant may be convicted as an aider and abetter even if that same
defendant was indicted as a principle for commission of the underlying
offense and not as an aider and abettor. However, the underlying of-
fense must be proven in either case.
United States v. Songer, 842 F.2d 240
Songer, the appellant, was indicted for his participation in a contin-
uing criminal enterprise. Songer posted bond, then broke off communi-
cations with his lawyer, and was assumed to have fled the country. A
trial in abstentia was held in which the jury returned a guilty verdict on all
counts, and required forfeiture of Songer's interest in certain real and
personal property under 21 U.S.C. § 853. As part of this judgment, the
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district court vested title to the forfeited property in the federal
government.
Forfeiture of property is considered a sentence under § 853. Ap-
pellant's counsel argued that sentencing in abstentia violates Fed. R.
Crim. Proc. 43. The Tenth Circuit vacated the judgment and order of
forfeiture and remanded the case with instructions that the sentence
could be imposed only when Songer is personally before the court.
United States v. Steven W, 850 F.2d 648
The appellant, Steven W., a juvenile, admitted to a violation before
a magistrate on March 20, and was adjudicated delinquent by a district
court on May 14. The appellant brought a motion to dismiss under 18
U.S.C. § 5037, asserting a failure to hold a disposition hearing within 20
days after the juvenile delinqueincy hearing was denied.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court and recognized that
the language of the statute clearly provides for the 20-day period to be-
gin to run when the court finds a juvenile to be delinquent in a juvenile
delinquency hearing. Therefore, the appeals court held that the judg-
ment and conviction in court, not the tender and acceptance of a plea
constitutes the determination of delinquency.
United States v. Strayer, 846 F.2d 1262
Appellant Strayer was indicted for conspiracy to possess with intent
to possess marijuana with intent to distribute. One month later, before
Strayer's arraignment, the government filed for a motion to dismiss the
indictment in "the interests of justice." Several months later, another
indictment was returned against Strayer. This indictment included
three alleged co-conspirators and charged the group with conspiracy
and possession with intent to distribute.
Strayer moved to dismiss the second indictment under Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 48(a), stating that the first indictment was dis-
missed without good cause. The Tenth Circuit held the dismissal of the
first indictment was for good cause since it was defective in not naming
the co-conspirators. The facts of this case were less compelling than
those in United States v. Derr, 726 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1984), in which the
court dismissed a second indictment when the first indictment was dis-
missed one day prior to trial over the defendant's objections and a sec-
ond indictment was not filed for two years. In the Strayer case, the
government dismissed the first indictment before Strayer was even ar-
raigned and the reindictment followed closely in time.
Strayer's allegation that the trial court imposed upon him the bur-
den of proving the accuracy of disputed materials in a sentencing report
is irrelevant. The court found that under Rule 32, when a defendant
alleges factual inaccuracy in a sentencing report, two options are avail-
able. The record did not indicate any violation of these options and the
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transcript clearly shows the judge stated he would not consider the al-
leged inaccurate factual statements.
United States v. Smith, 857 F.2d 682
Robert Smith, the appellant, was convicted on charges of distribu-
tion of controlled substances. Smith appealed based upon the wording
of the Allen charges, and the denial of the disclosure of a confidential
informant.
Allen charges have been allowed by the Tenth Circuit. The instruc-
tions to the jury in the Smith case were objected to because the instruc-
tions stated that the parties "will" be put to the expense of another trial
if unanimity is not reached. The Tenth Circuit found that the instruc-
tion as a whole conveys the possibility that the case might not be retried
and therefore upheld the wording of the instructions in this case.
The court also held that the law is clear in its intent to keep the
identity of a confidential informant concealed unless the circumstances
of the case require disclosure. The court suggested that fairness or a
specific need for information by the defendant might allow for disclo-
sure in certain situations.
United States v. Rodriguez-Pando, 841 F.2d 1014
Rodriguez-Pando (Pando) was stopped on the highway by a New
Mexico law enforcemnt officer. Pando was weaving erratically, and the
the officer suspected an intoxicated driver. When Pando was stopped
the officer requested his driver's license. Pando opened the glove box
and began pulling out a gun. The officer arrested him, searched his ve-
hicle, and found 1100 pounds of cocaine.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding that the initial stopping of
Pando's vehicle was justified because of a reasonable suspicion that he
was intoxicated. Pando's arrest was lawful as well since he assaulted the
officer by pulling out a gun from his glove compartment. The automo-
bile exception to warrantless searches was valid in this case because the
preceeding events provided probable cause to reasonably believe that
the truck contained illegal drugs.
Pando made a tape-recorded statement to police that he had been
coerced into transporting the drugs by threats made upon his family. At
trial this statement was excluded as hearsay. The Tenth Circuit affirmed
the trial court because the statement was not made under oath and was
not subject to cross-examination. The tape was hearsay since it was of-
fered to prove that Pando had been threatened. In addition, a search
warrant was obtained to conduct a urinalysis examination. In order to
attack this warrant for urinalysis, Pando must make a substantial prelimi-
nary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally was in-
cluded by the affiant and the false statement was necessary for a showing
of probable cause. Pando failed to show these things. Pando's objection
to the magistrate's lack of expert knowledge on drugs was rejected, and
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the trial court's discretion that the probative value of the urinalysis was
greater than the prejudice it created was upheld.
United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485
Appeal from the district court's order to exempt assets otherwise
subject to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 853, to the extent necessary to
pay reasonable attorney's fees and holding the criminal forfeiture stat-
ute invalid. Reversed.
Appellee was charged with a drug felony subject to criminal forfei-
ture. Nichols asserted that the forfeiture statute violated his right to
choice of counsel since application of the statute to him would finan-
cially limit his choice. The ownership of the property is not known at
the time the restraining order is sought, and freezing the assets may pre-
vent the defendant from using assets in a manner which could prove
his/her innocence. Nevertheless, the court determined that Congress
acted within its authority in applying a relation back provision to create a
governmental interest in the property involved in criminal activity. The
defendant does not have a constitutional right to use assets subject to
forfeiture and this limitation does not infringe on the defendant's right
to counsel. There is no constitutional right to chosen counsel and the
possibility of prosecutors using criminal forfeiture to influence a defend-
ant's choice of counsel does not render the statute unconstitutional. If
forfeiture results in the defendant not being able to hire counsel then an
attorney will be appointed.
United States v. Savaiano, 843 F.2d 1280
Law enforcement officers tapped the residential telephone of appel-
lant McPherson. The recordings became the basis of indictments charg-
ing McPherson and Savaiano with conspiracy to manufacture
amphetamine, using a telephone to further the conspiracy, and attempt
to manufacture amphetamine.
The validity of the wiretap was challenged under the Kansas Elec-
tronic Surveillance Act, but the court of appeals found no violation
which would require suppression and no constitutional rights were in-
fringed. Probable cause existed to issue orders to wiretap as evidenced
by surveillance, testimony of officers, and an earlier pen register. Nor-
mal investigating techniques were shown not to work in these circum-
stances since McPherson could not be tailed and no surveillance could
take place within one-half block of the residence. Assistant district attor-
neys conducted proceedings for application of the orders instead of dis-
trict attorneys as stated in the statute, however the district attorney
personally appeared, was sworn, and was available during the proceed-
ing for examination by the judge. Thus, the assistant district attorneys'
activities did not violate the requirements of the statute.
The Tenth Circuit also held that a variance between the wiretap or-
der and the indictments concerning the type of drug (amphetamine or
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methamphetamine) was not a violation of the Act, nor was the failure to
furnish an inventory within 90 days. The statutory requirement of an
inventory was fulfilled, by giving timely notice and including all the in-
formation that would have been in the inventory to McPherson, despite
claimed deficiencies in the service of the inventory. The appellants were
properly convicted on both conspiracy and attempt charges since the
crimes are separate and contain separate elements. Enough acts in fur-
therance of the crimes had been taken to fulfill both sets of elements.
United States v. Murray, 843 F.2d 1582
Appeal from a denial to sever appellant's trial from that of the two
codefendants in prosecution for possession of amphetamines with intent
to distribute. Affirmed.
The refusal to sever the trials was a harmless error because the
statements made by a codefendant, which tended to incriminate Murray,
pertained to matters that were incidental to the case against Murray.
The evidence against Murray was so overwhelming that any incriminat-
ing statements that might have been made by a codefendant were trivial
in comparison.
United States v. Peterman, 841 F.2d 1474
Appeal from a conviction for consumer fraud under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1343 and an enhancement of the sentence at a second trial. Affirmed
in part and remanded in part.
Appellant, Peterman, was indicted for various fraudulent practices
in the advertising and sale of meat from his store. He was convicted at a
1981 trial but the conviction was reversed for failure to give a good faith
instruction. The second trial, from which this appeal was taken, also
resulted in a conviction.
Peterman first alleged that the court's jury instructions defining
"bait and switch" tactics improperly expanded the scope of the indict-
ment, allowing the jury to reach a guilty verdict on the basis of a theory
not relied upon by the grand jury. The Tenth Circuit decided that jury
instructions are invalid only if their deviation from the indictment in-
fringes on the defendant's rights. That was not the situation in this case.
The court also found that evidence of a codefendant's prior conviction
was admissable to impeach the codefendant's testimony in the second
trial under F.R.E. 607. This evidence was not unduly prejudicial as the
trial court properly limited its use. Finally, Peterman challenged the en-
hancement of his sentence at the second trial. Even though a court has
almost unlimited discretion in determining what information to hear
and rely on for sentencing, the court must affirmatively reflect its rea-
sons for enhancing the original sentence. On remand, the trial court
must permit Peterman to explain why the report upon which the court
relied was incorrect, and then the court must reflect any reasons for en-
hancing Peterman's sentence.
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United States v. Green, 847 F.2d 622
Appellant Green appeals the district court's refusal to dismiss his
indictment for the armed robbery of a federal savings and loan associa-
tion on the grounds that the government did not properly alert him to
his right to a speedy trial. The government argued that Green's notice
of appeal, which was filed after Green's conditional plea of guilty but
before sentencing, was premature and thus did not confer jurisdiction
upon the court of appeals. The court of appeals initially accepted the
government's argument, but upon this rehearing, it decided Green's no-
tice of rehearing, though premature, was an inconsequential irregularity
under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) and was sufficient to confer jurisdiction.
Earlier judgment withdrawn with orders to parties to brief the merits of
the appeal.
United States v. Orr, 864 F.2d 1505
Appellant Logan appeals his conviction for conspiracy to file false
income tax returns on the grounds the district court failed to suppress
illegally obtained evidence, and improperly admitted evidence of prior
acts of misconduct. Affirmed.
The court of appeals noted that probable cause does not require
certainty, and upheld the district court's finding that a contested search
warrant was valid. The court also upheld the district court's admission
of evidence of prior misconduct since it helped prove key elements of
the conspiracy charge (knowing participation in the scheme). Since this
use of the evidence did not make it "extrinsic" to the behavior on trial, it
did not have to be admissable under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
United States v. Jimenez, 864 F.2d 686
Appellant Jimenez appeals the district court's denial of a motion to
suppress evidence seized from the trunk of his car, which was involved
in a serious traffic accident. Affirmed.
Albuquerque police investigating a traffic accident spotted a sawed-
off shotgun in the trunk of Jimenez's car, which had been forced open
due to a collision with another automobile. The court of appeals held
that the motion to suppress had been properly denied, since the shot-
gun, though in the trunk, was nonetheless in plain view, and that it
would have eventually been discovered by police as they inventoried the
items in Jimenez's totalled automobile.
United States v. Rantz, 862 F.2d 808
Petitioner was convicted of conspiring to defraud the government
by filing fraudulent income tax returns. Petitioner moved to vacate sen-
tence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 based on allegations that he was
denied effective assistance of counsel and that the trial court committed
error in refusing to subpoena additional witnessess for the evidentiary
hearing on the allegation of denial of effective assistance of counsel, in
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requiring petitioner to testify at the beginning of his case in chief in the
event he decided to testify, denying petitioner an opportunity to read
the presentence report, and in not resolving objections to the report
prior to the imposition of the sentence. Petitioner's motion was denied,
and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
The court held that petitioner failed in his allegation of denial of
effective assistance of counsel to meet his burden of proving that (1) his
counsel acted unreasonably; and (2) that such resulted in prejudice to
petitioner. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
subpoena witnesses, since subpoenas need not be issued for witnesses
providing mere cumulative evidence. And though it is error for a trial
court to permit a defendant to testify only at the beginning of his case in
chief, the error was harmless. The evidence also showed that petitioner
had, in fact, read the presentence report. Finally, the court held that the
trial court did not err in failing to resolve alleged factual inaccuracies in
the presentence report, since no objection was raised by petitioner.

